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Abstract 
A survey of organic grain and oilseed producers in Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin was 
conducted to collect information about their demographic characteristics, production and price 
risk management strategies, yields and losses, and crop insurance decisions. The data are 
analyzed using a discrete choice model to establish which variables influence organic 
producers’ decision of whether to purchase crop insurance and also which ones affect the 
insurance product choice when applicable. The study describes the risk profiles of organic 
producers, and analyzes whether significant variations exist between organic and conventional 
methods of production so as to quantitatively determine the differential production risk 
associated with organic production. This research may contribute to the design of an organic 
crop insurance policy in which organic producers would be charged according to their 
idiosyncratic production risks, rather than the arbitrary 5% blanket premium surcharge 
currently in use.  
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I. Introduction 
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 recognized organic farming as a good farming 
practice. Thus, organic crops are covered by Federal crop insurance taking into account some of 
the idiosyncrasies of the organic production system. In addition to the production risks covered 
for conventional producers, organic farmers that sign up for coverage are compensated for 
production losses from damage due to insects, disease, and/or weeds (Dimitri and Greene, 2002). 
In total, the Risk Management Agency (RMA) provided roughly $90 billion in crop insurance 
protection in 2008, covering over 350 commodities across 272 million acres. 
However, the incorporation of organic production into the crop insurance rating structure 
has been limited. Currently, the base premium rates are determined across all production 
practices, both conventional and organic. In choosing the organic production practice, producers 
are charged an arbitrary 5% premium surcharge over conventional crop insurance. No other 
adjustments are made to the premium rate to reflect organic production practices. In the case of 
crop failure, organic farmers receive compensation based on conventionally produced crop 
prices. Thus, price premiums that organic producers are able to obtain in the market are not 
compensated for under the current insurance policy structure (RMA, 2008).  
During 2001 and 2002, Hanson et al. (2004), with RMA sponsorship, organized 
nationwide focus groups with organic farmers to identify and describe their risks and needs for 
assistance. In their study, they point out that organic farming may involve different risks than 
conventional farming because it does not rely on the use of pesticides and insecticides as risk 
management tools. Organic farmers rely instead, for example, on the use of mechanical 
cultivation, crop rotation and use of beneficial insect populations to manage their crops. The 
authors also indicate that besides weeds, pests and diseases, contamination with genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), input shortage, and non-stable price premiums were mentioned by 
organic producers as the most relevant risks that affect their production.  
In addition, at the focus group meetings organized by Hanson et al. (2004), organic 
farmers identified Federal crop insurance as a useful risk management tool. However, they also 
expressed their discontent with the current crop insurance policies. Farmers argued that the 
coverage being offered does not reflect the organic price premiums that they would receive in the 
market compared to their fellow non-organic producers (Hanson et al., 2004). Further evidence 
in this regard is provided by Chen et al. (2007), who showed that, even though crop insurance is 
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an important tool for apple growers to manage risk, “the low price selection and low price 
premium setting do not provide enough indemnity [to organic growers] when losses occur”. 
Furthermore, Greene and Kremen (2003) also argue that limited access to crop insurance may 
discourage conventional farmers from switching to organic farming. 
The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, which amends part of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act, was written to investigate some of these claims, requiring the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture to examine the currently offered Federal crop insurance coverage for organic crops 
as described in the organic policy provisions of the 2008 Farm Bill (Title XII of the Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act, 2008). Such provisions establish the need to review, among 
others, the underwriting risk and loss experience of organic crops, determine whether significant, 
consistent, or variations in loss history exist between organic and non-organic production, and in 
accordance with the results, reduce, eliminate or increase the 5% premium surcharge for 
coverage of organic crops that applies to all crops and regions across the U.S.  
In reviewing the scientific literature related to organic versus conventional yield 
comparisons, several examples can be cited. The results are mixed. Badgley et al. (2007) 
conducted the most comprehensive review of organic vs. conventional yields worldwide and 
found few differences between the two production systems. Delate et al. (2003) found that 
organic corn and soybean yields were equivalent to conventional yields. Pimentel et al. (2005) 
reported that, over 22 years of a long-term comparison trial, organic yields were comparable to 
conventional corn and soybean yields. Mäder et al. (2002) obtained organic yields that were 
between 80% and 100% of conventional yields for all crops over 21 years in an organic rotation 
of wheat, potatoes, and grass-clover hay. Other studies reported corn yield in an organic system 
reaching 91.8% of conventional corn yield (Delate and Cambardella, 2004). In the same study, 
organic soybean yield was 99.6% of conventional soybean yield. Porter (2003) reported organic 
corn yields 7 to 9% lower and organic soybean yields 16% to 19% lower than conventional crop 
yields. In a survey conducted by the Organic Farming Research Foundation (2001), organic corn 
yields across the U.S. were found to average 95% of conventional yields. In general, organic 
horticultural crops often yield less than conventional horticultural crops (Delate, 2002), but some 
exceptions exist. 
Importantly, after an extensive literature review we found a noticeable lack of rigorous 
studies focusing on the difference in production risks of organic versus conventional crops on 
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actual farms. The majority of the data comes from yields obtained at experimental plots. This 
implies that, to the best of our knowledge, currently there is no basis to quantitatively determine 
the differential production risk associated with organics, and therefore, whether the insurance 
premiums currently charged to organic producers are actuarially fair. This lack of data implies 
that research is needed to start filling that gap and to better understand organic farmers’ demand 
for crop insurance (or lack of it). Thus, given the review of the organic crop insurance coverage 
policies mandated by the Farm Bill, the purpose of this study is to investigate the current demand 
for crop insurance from organic grain and oilseed producers in three Midwestern states.  
Specifically, the objectives of this study are three-fold. First, the study aims at delineating 
the profile characteristics of organic corn and soybean producers in Iowa, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin; as well as describing their production and price risk management strategies usage 
and comparing it to that of crop insurance. Second, the study analyzes the demand for crop 
insurance from organic corn and soybean producers in the aforementioned states using a discrete 
choice model, and attempts to determine which variables, if any, influence their decision of 
whether to purchase crop insurance, as well as their product choices. Finally, the third objective 
of the study is to determine the differential production risk associated with organic corn and 
soybean production in the states under analysis. 
 
II. Data 
The lack of available data on organics crops in general, and on the demand for crop insurance by 
organic farmers in particular, stimulated us to collect it ourselves by using a mail survey 
instrument. We conducted a survey targeting organic corn and soybean producers in three 
Midwestern states: Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin. These three states were selected because 
they account for over 40% of the U.S. organic cropland destined for organic corn and soybeans, 
which in turn are among the main organic crops in the U.S. in terms of acreage. Furthermore, 
Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin are the top three states in terms of organic corn acreage, and 
Iowa and Minnesota are the top two states regarding organic soybean acreage (USDA-ERS, 
2008a-b-c).  
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The clientele targeted by our survey were 665 producers of organic corn and soybean in 
Iowa, 366 in Minnesota and 550 in Wisconsin, adding up to a total of 1,581. The survey was sent 
out in late March 2009 to organic producers across Iowa, and in early May 2009 to farmers in 
Minnesota and Wisconsin. In both rounds, after three weeks a reminder letter was sent to 
increase the number of returns. A total of 212 surveys were returned giving a response rate of 
13%; however, the number of surveys that effectively corresponded to organic producers who 
gave sufficiently comprehensive responses was 129. Panels A and B of figure 1 show the number 
of responses by state and by type of operation, respectively. Type of operation refers to whether 
the producer is certified organic, transitioning to organic or mixed (i.e.: conventional and organic 
simultaneously). We also received one survey in which the farmer stated that his production was 
chemical free. 
 
Figure 1. Number of surveys by state and by type of operation 
      A. Number of responses by state 
 
 B. Number of responses by type of operation 
 
 
The survey’s questions could be divided into three categories according to the nature of 
the information that they intended to gather. The first part of the survey was intended to collect 
information on demographic variables of organic producers so as to delineate the profile of 
organic grain and oilseed producers. The distributions for those variables are shown in the 
different panels of figures 2 and 3.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of the respondents’ demographic characteristics 
A. Age distribution 
 
 
 
B. Level of education 
 
C. Years farming D. Years organic farming 
 
The second part of the survey was designed to collect information on producers’ 
production and marketing risk strategies. The purpose of this section was to be able to 
understand what alternatives to crop insurance organic producers use to diversify their risks 
because organic markets are characterized by being thin; therefore, marketing is different from 
that of conventional crops. Born (2005) exemplifies this situation with the case of organically 
produced grains: “While the conventional grower can deposit a whole harvest at the elevator, 
organic production is usually contracted with a specific buyer ahead of planting”. Born argues 
that this is due to the fact that in many cases organic crops do not have spot markets, and so 
contracts are a tool producers use to manage risk. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the respondents’ farm and off-farm income, and farm size  
A. Farm income 
 
 
B. Off farm income  
 
 
C. Farm size of certified organic farmers 
 
 
D. Farm size of mixed farmers 
 
 
Dimitri and Oberholtzer (2008a) found evidence that contracting is the primary method for 
selling in the organic sector. In 2004, organic handlers procured 46% of their supply under 
written contracts, 24% under informal contracts and 27% through spot markets. In contrast, 
MacDonald et al. (2004) found that in conventional agriculture spot market transactions account 
for 60% of all purchases. Dimitri and Oberholtzer (2008b) also found that contracts in the 
organic sector are based on the handlers’ perspective to reduce transaction costs of finding 
enough product, not for risk sharing. In addition to contracting, the authors found that handlers in 
many cases maintain close relationships with suppliers by assisting them, sometimes even 
recruiting them, in order to gain access to organic products. To evaluate the validity of these 
findings, we asked organic producers to indicate and rank in percentages the way they market 
their crops. The results that we obtained are displayed in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Marketing / price risk management strategies 
 
 
The third part of the survey was aimed at collecting information regarding organic 
producers’ demand of crop insurance and their risk and loss experience during the last few years. 
Variables that measured producers’ characteristics included age, education, operation, farm size, 
farm and off-farm income, number of years farming and number of years of organic farming. 
Age, farm size, number of years farming and number of years of organic farming were 
continuous variables, whereas education, operation, and farm and off-farm income were all 
ordered categorical variables. Education took values from 1 to 5 according to the number of 
years that the main operator attended school, where a higher number denoted more years. 
Operation took values from 1 to 4, where 1 indicated chemical free, 2 certified organic, 3 
transitioning, and 4 mixed production. Farm and off-farm income had 5 and 6 categories 
respectively, and a higher income bracket translated into a higher number.  
One final note on the nature of our survey is that, in contrast to the insurance data that 
RMA will use to develop the new crop insurance policy, the data we collected is unlikely to be 
biased by adverse selection. The RMA database has been gathered by having insured organic 
producers each year. However, adverse selection and moral hazard are to be found in agricultural 
insurance markets due to asymmetric information (Smith and Baquet, 1996). Hence, the RMA 
data may be biased by adverse selection because in most likelihood the proportion of organic 
producers finding the 5% organic policy premium attractive is much greater in the RMA sample 
than in the population of organic farmers as a whole; in other words, the database of organic 
farmers that have been purchasing insurance under the current insurance policy is likely to 
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comprise the producers with greatest risk.1 Also, given the relatively new incorporation of 
organic agriculture to the Federal crop insurance coverage and the lack of experience of new 
organic producers, adverse selection could be even greater for the pool of insured organic 
producers; this is due to the fact that RMA’s calculation of insurance guarantees and premium 
rates require as few as four years of yield data available inducing large sample errors [see 
Carriquiry, Babcock and Hart (2008) for an analysis of such sampling errors in the estimation of 
farmer’s mean yields and their effects on adverse selection, as well as their proposed estimator to 
reduce it]. Therefore, to the extent that the survey data and the RMA data differ, we might be 
better positioned to determine the organic risk differential and the factors that influence the 
demand for organic corn and soybean crop insurance in the geographic area under study. 
 
III. Discrete Choice Model of Insurance Demand by Organic Farmers 
There is a vast empirical economic literature on the demand for crop insurance, but much of it 
based on aggregate data (e.g., Barnett; Gardner and Kramer; Barnett, Skees and Hourigan; 
Goodwin; Richards). Empirical studies relying upon farm level data can be divided into two 
groups, namely, one group focusing on the producer’s decision of whether to purchase insurance 
(Calvin 1992; Coble et al., 1996; Just and Calvin, 1994; Vandeveer and Loehman, 1994), and 
another group analyzing simultaneous decisions regarding crop insurance. These simultaneous 
decisions were either insurance purchase and coverage-level election (Smith and Baquet, 1996) 
or insurance purchase and product choice (Makki and Somwaru, 2001; Mishra and Goodwin, 
2003; Shaik et al., 2008; Sherrick et al., 2004). The present analysis follows the latter line of 
work. 
The theoretical framework under which farmers’ crop insurance purchase decision is 
typically examined is that of expected utility maximization subject to a set of constraints 
(Sherrick et al., Smith and Baquet, Goodwin, Coble et al., Calvin, Just and Calvin). In the 
theoretical model presented by Shaik et al. (2008), which is built upon the participation model of 
Coble et al. (1996), the authors assume that farmers have a Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility 
function and that they maximize their expected utility by choosing among the insurance 
alternatives that they have available. Mathematically, their expected utility model is given by 
                                                        
1Just, Calvin, and Quiggin (1999) analyze the effects of asymmetric information on adverse selection in crop 
insurance 
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jjj XEU εβ +′= , where j denotes each alternative, the βs are vectors of coefficients on 
exogenous variables X and the εs are random disturbances. Shaik et al. empirically analyze the 
participation choice of producers using a multinomial logit model. Contrastingly, Sherrick et al. 
(2004) evaluate the producers’ participation decision in a first stage by means of a binomial 
logit; and then in a second stage the authors evaluate the product choice of those farmers that 
purchased insurance using an unordered multinomial logit. Therefore, the main difference 
between the empirical models by Shaik et al. and Sherrick et al. is whether the product choice is 
modeled in the same stage as the participation decision. 
Due to the disparity in the number of responses regarding purchase and product choice 
that we obtained in our survey, a model with a single step decision process would have discarded 
valuable information from producers that reported whether they purchased insurance but did not 
specify which product they bought. Thus, a two-stage empirical model similar to that of Sherrick 
et al. (2004) was more appropriate for our analysis. Given that we evaluated the purchase of only 
two alternative insurance products (because of the responses that we received), we ran two 
binomial logit regressions sequentially; the first one to evaluate the organic producers’ 
participation decision and the second one for those who purchased insurance and decided 
between yield and revenue products. In the first stage (second stage), it is assumed that the 
probability of farmer n choosing alternative j is given by: 
2
1
exp( )
exp( )
j n
jn
j n
j
X
P
X
β
β
=
′
=
′∑
      j= 1, 2                                       (1) 
where 1 and 2 denote no insurance and insurance purchase (yield insurance and revenue 
insurance), respectively. Given that the probabilities add up to one, the parameter vectors of one 
alternative can be normalized to zero. Thus, based on equation (1), the probabilities of each 
alternative are given by: 
1
2
1
1 exp( )n
n
P
Xβ= ′+     and   
2
2
2
exp( )
1 exp( )
n
n
n
XP
X
β
β
′
=
′+
. 
The explanatory variables included in Xn are age, farm size, number of years farming, 
number of years of organic farming, type of operation, education, farm and off-farm income, as 
well as dummy variables for the state in which the farm was located. For the first stage, a priori 
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one would expect age, number of years farming and education to have a positive sign, implying 
that those producers are more experienced and knowledgeable about crop insurance as a risk 
diversifying tool. One would also expect farm size to have a positive sign, indicating that 
producers with more acreage would have, to some extent, a greater need for managing their risk. 
With respect to type of operation and years of organic farming, one would expect them to have a 
negative sign, denoting organic producers’ reluctance to purchase crop insurance under the 
current policy. Finally, one would expect farm income to have a positive sign, conveying the 
reliance of the household income on farm operations; contrastingly, one would expect off-farm 
to have a negative sign, because working off-farm is a competing risk-diversifying strategy to 
crop insurance. 
 
Results 
The results for the two sequential logit regressions for corn and soybean are shown in Tables 1 
and 2 respectively.2 The panels denoted as first stages correspond to the logit analysis of the 
question of whether producers had bought crop insurance in the year 2008; whereas the second 
stage panels denote the logit analysis of which insurance product they purchased for that year. In 
the first stages the base case was no insurance purchase and in the second ones it was the 
purchase of a yield product. 
The results of the first stage for corn shown in Table 1 suggest that insurance purchasers 
are characterized by being older, having more (fewer) years of farming (organic farming), and 
higher (lower) farm income (off-farm income). The signs of the corresponding estimated 
coefficients are consistent with the a-priori expected relationships, but none of them turned out to 
be statistically significant. Instead, farm size and education were significant at the 10 and 5% 
level respectively; thus, organic farmers with larger farms and more formal education were more 
likely to purchase crop insurance. Also the type of operation influenced corn producers’ 
insurance purchasing decision. Not surprisingly, mixed farmers were found to be more likely to 
purchase crop insurance, most likely due to the fact that they purchase it for their conventional 
crops and just extend the coverage to the organic ones. 
                                                        
2We also ran the models including an additional variable; namely, the actual production history (APH) premium rate 
that we calculated for each farmer based on their yields and county information. Thus, such variable represented the 
premium rate that each farmer would have had to pay had he chosen APH coverage at the 65% coverage in 2008. 
However, the variable was not statistically significant and the rest of the results did not change considerably. 
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Table 1. Econometric results for insurance participation and product choice of organic corn 
producers 
    Stage 1:         Stage 2:   
 
 
No purchase / Purchase 
  
APH / CRC 
   Coefficient t-stat p-value 
  
Coefficient t-stat p-value 
 Constant -4.441 -2.37 0.018 ** 
 
-0.646 -0.28 0.782 
 Age  0.023 0.98 0.329 
  
-0.235 -2.46 0.014 ** 
Farm size  0.002 1.80 0.071 * 
 
 0.000 0.32 0.750 
 Yrs. Farming  0.021 0.82 0.411 
  
-0.001 -0.01 0.992 
 Yrs.Org. farm -0.001 -0.02 0.981 
  
 0.124 1.63 0.103 
 Operation  0.818 2.20 0.028 ** 
 
 0.701 1.23 0.218 
 Education  0.462 2.20 0.028 ** 
 
 1.130 2.09 0.037 ** 
Farm income  0.034 0.19 0.850 
  
-0.101 -0.33 0.743 
 Off farm inc. -0.062 -0.55 0.581 
  
-0.231 -1.04 0.296 
 Minnesota -0.293 -0.49 0.628 
  
-0.677 -0.57 0.569 
 Wisconsin -0.995 -1.85 0.064 * 
 
-0.131 -0.12 0.907 
 
          Nobs 109 
    
Nobs 47 
  Log. Likelihood -58.07 
    
Log. Likelihood -18.66 
  AIC 138.15         AIC 65.13     
*** (**, *) Denotes significantly different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on the two-sided t statistic. 
In addition, the dummy variable for organic farmers in Wisconsin shows that producers in that 
state are significantly less likely to purchase insurance than farmers in Iowa, which is the base 
case. Contrastingly, the results of the first binomial logit stage for soybean producers shown in 
Table 2 indicate that type of operation is the only variable statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Although the variable years of organic farming is not significant, it has a negative coefficient in 
this case as well. 
In the second stage for corn (soybean) the number of observations dropped to 47 (49) 
because the sample only included those organic farmers that stated which crop insurance product 
they purchased for the year 2008. The results for corn suggest that producers who are younger, 
have larger farms, fewer (more) years of (organic) farming, more education and lower farm and 
off-farm income are more likely to purchase Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) products than yield 
products like Actual Production History (APH). Nevertheless, only age and education were 
significant at the 5% level. In the second stage for soybean, age and off farm income have a 
negative coefficient and they are significant at the 5% level, whereas years of organic farming 
and education have positive coefficients and are significant at the 10% level; implying that 
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organic producers who are younger, with less off farm income, more organic farming experience 
and more years of formal education are more likely to buy CRC. 
Table 2. Econometric results for insurance participation and product choice of organic soybean 
producers 
    Stage 1:         Stage 2:   
 
 
No purchase / Purchase 
  
APH / CRC 
   Coefficient t-stat p-value 
  
Coefficient t-stat p-value 
 Constant -3.474 -2.21 0.027 ** 
 
-0.937 -0.41 0.681 
 Age  0.037 1.11 0.269 
  
-0.147 -2.39 0.017 ** 
Farm size  0.001 1.40 0.162 
  
 0.000 0.57 0.569 
 Yrs. Farming  0.032 1.05 0.293 
  
 0.018 0.38 0.705 
 Yrs.Org. farm -0.002 -0.06 0.949 
  
 0.136 1.87 0.062 * 
Operation  0.950 2.08 0.038 ** 
 
 0.243 0.51 0.610 
 Education  0.323 1.36 0.175 
  
 0.705 1.72 0.086 * 
Farm income -0.061 -0.31 0.755 
  
-0.109 -0.45 0.655 
 Off farm inc. -0.012 -0.09 0.929 
  
-0.434 -1.99 0.046 ** 
Minnesota -0.056 -0.08 0.934 
  
 0.070 0.07 0.948 
 Wisconsin  0.136 0.20 0.842 
  
-0.434 -0.46 0.649 
 
          Nobs 78 
    
Nobs 49 
  Log. Likelihood -42.86 
    
Log. Likelihood -22.47 
  AIC 107.73         AIC 66.95     
*** (**, *) Denotes significantly different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level, based on the two-sided t statistic. 
The survey data contain additional information that complement the above discrete 
choice model results and may help to better understand organic farmers’ demand for crop 
insurance. To this end, figure 5 displays the farmers’ participation decision in percentages by 
state. Interestingly, the percentage of organic surveyed farmers in Wisconsin who purchased crop 
insurance (34.7%) was about the same as the one for those in Iowa who did not purchase it 
(36.4%). Meanwhile, in Minnesota the percentage of buyers (45.7%) and non-buyers (51.4%) 
was divided more evenly. The reasons for this difference in participation among states are not 
clear, but they might be related to a similar behavior in the commodity cases.  
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Figure 5. Insurance purchase by state 
                       All States                                                               IA 
 
 
                           WI                                       MN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References: 
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the surveyed farmers’ responses regarding their usage 
of alternative strategies to diversify production risk, including crop insurance. It can be seen that 
planting multiple crops and employing rotations is a standard practice (and a mandatory one if a 
producer wants to become certified organic). The results also show that having livestock in an 
organic farm is a widespread practice, whereas irrigating is not. From figure 6 it can also be seen 
that the waters are divided among organic farmers when it comes to crop insurance, since about 
half of them purchase it and the other half does not. 
If organic producers responded that they had never bought crop insurance, they were 
asked to indicate in a Likert scale their motivation for not buying it among a list of preponderant 
reasons found in the literature as the result of focus groups. The usefulness of the information 
provided by the responses to this question should be evident, since it would give policymakers 
valuable knowledge regarding organic corn and soybean producers’ demand (or lack of it) for 
crop insurance. 
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Figure 6. Production risk diversifying strategies and usage comparison relative to crop 
insurance 
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The distribution of such responses is summarized in figure 7. An important result is that the top 
reason organic farmers indicated for not buying crop insurance is that they use their own 
strategies to diversify risk (43% of the respondents agreed with that statement). An even more 
important result from figure 7 is that 34% of the farmers responded that they have never 
purchased crop insurance because they prefer not to participate in federal programs, implying 
that they would not buy it regardless of any improvement to the insurance policy to make it more 
actuarially fair. 
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Figure 7. Non buyers’ reasons for not purchasing crop insurance: Likert scale responses’ 
distribution 
Not all crops 
covered No GMO coverage 
Use off farm 
income Use own strategies 
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IV. Yields and Prices Associated with Organic Grains and Oilseeds 
The results from the discrete choice model presented in the previous section offer only a partial 
analysis of the crop insurance demand by the surveyed organic producers. As mentioned earlier, 
the incorporation of organic production into the crop insurance rating structure has been limited, 
thereby negatively influencing producers’ crop insurance purchase decisions. First, because 
RMA assumes that organic production has the same yield level as conventional production with 
5% more yield risk. The evidence shown next suggests that although organic oats attain 
equivalent yields to that of its conventional counterpart, that is not the case for organic corn and 
soybean. Second, because RMA in the current crop insurance policy also assumes that the prices 
that organic and conventional producers obtain in the market are the same. But Singerman and 
Lence (2010) have shown that organic corn and soybean prices are consistently and significantly 
higher than the prices of conventional corn and soybean, with about the same risk. As explained 
below, in our survey we also found evidence regarding this issue. In addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, Singerman and Lence (2010) found that organic crop prices do not follow 
conventional crop prices. 
Table 3 shows the average yield, price and revenue obtained by the organic producers we 
surveyed for corn, soybean and oats. As a way of comparing such results to those of 
conventional producers, we used National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) data; the results 
are also included in table 3. In that table there is also a column called 4-year APH (Actual 
Production History), which denotes the 4-year yield average calculation. In the three Midwestern 
states surveyed, organic corn and soybean yields are about 70% of conventional yields. 
However, organic oat yields are about the same as conventional ones.  
The finding of a lower yield level for organic corn and soybean on its own does not allow 
one to infer that organic crops are riskier. Instead, it indicates that when insuring their crops 
under the current policy, organic corn and soybean farmers are being misrated twice. The first 
time when charged a 5% surcharge over their conventional fellows, the second time because 
under the Multiple Peril Crop Insurance calculations the Base Premium Rate is computed taking 
into account a reference yield that is determined at the county level, and it is irrespective of the 
farmers’ production practices. Thus, based on our results when having a lower yield level and 
being compared to conventional yields, organic producers are subject to premium rates that are 
not tied to their idiosyncratic yield distributions. 
  
1
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Table 3. Comparison of average yield, price and revenue obtained by organic (survey) and conventional (NASS) producers from 
2005 to 2008 in the selected states 
4-year APH
avg 
yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs
survey 118 113 9.02 1,017 35 125 8.97 1,120 30 123 6.54 805 26 112 5.22 583 21
NASS 170 171 3.95 675 n/a 171 4.29 734 n/a 166 3.03 503 n/a 173 1.94 336 n/a
survey 106 107 8.09 864 13 115 9.41 1,081 9 102 7.66 784 9 101 6.47 655 7
NASS 161 164 3.80 623 n/a 146 4.13 603 n/a 161 2.89 465 n/a 174 1.86 324 n/a
survey 99 102 9.39 953 20 94 8.27 778 15 102 8.58 879 10 99 8.15 803 7
NASS 141 137 3.50 480 n/a 135 4.11 555 n/a 143 3.04 435 n/a 148 1.94 287 n/a
4-year APH
avg 
yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs
survey 31 26 21.69 574 27 31 20.80 648 23 35 16.69 577 20 33 14.89 494 21
NASS 50 46 9.65 444 n/a 52 10.50 546 n/a 51 6.58 332 n/a 53 5.54 291 n/a
survey 29 28 25.11 709 9 28 17.51 496 12 29 15.77 453 11 31 16.42 509 10
NASS 43 38 9.60 365 n/a 43 10.20 434 n/a 45 6.26 279 n/a 46 5.53 252 n/a
survey 29 29 21.67 618 8 27 20.60 564 8 32 13.67 437 5 29 15.31 450 5
NASS 41 35 9.20 322 n/a 41 9.83 398 n/a 44 6.04 266 n/a 44 5.64 248 n/a
4-year APH
avg 
yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs avg yield
avg 
price
avg 
revenue
# obs
survey 67 59 5.33 312 11 59 4.29 254 11 73 4.21 306 9 78 3.83 299 9
NASS 73 65 3.20 208 n/a 71 2.74 195 n/a 76 1.94 147 n/a 79 1.69 134 n/a
survey 69 71 5.27 372 9 65 3.95 257 9 68 3.55 241 8 72 3.27 236 8
NASS 62 68 2.65 180 n/a 60 2.49 149 n/a 56 1.93 108 n/a 62 1.47 91 n/a
survey 63 59 3.58 210 7 64 4.28 273 9 66 2.11 139 3 63 n/a n/a 2
NASS 64 62 2.70 167 n/a 67 2.46 165 n/a 63 1.78 112 n/a 64 1.54 99 n/a
IA
MN
WI
IA
MN
WI
Oats
2008 2007 2006 2005
MN
WI
Soybean
2008 2007 2006 2005
Corn
2008 2007 2006 2005
IA
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Table 4. Comparison of average yield, standard deviation and average price obtained by insured and non-insured (denoted non) 
organic producers from 2005 to 2008 in the selected states    
4-year APH
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
insurers 121 114 40 9 20 126 23 9 20 123 38 6 18 120 30 5 15
non 110 105 20 9 14 122 19 9 10 124 26 7 8 90 25 5 6
insurers 73 122 15 8 3 87 37 10 3 43 23 11 2 40 n/a 12 1
non 121 120 21 9 8 129 24 9 6 122 32 6 7 114 10 5 6
insurers 103 100 35 9 9 85 41 9 6 115 35 6 4 110 39 5 5
non 93 103 19 10 11 100 31 8 9 94 46 10 6 75 45 13 2
4-year APH
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
insurers 30 25 10 22.20 17 28 11 20.10 14 33 13 16.63 13 33 12 15.20 15
non 33 28 8 22.32 9 36 11 22.11 9 37 12 16.85 7 34 9 14.18 6
insurers 25 24 6 24.88 4 25 4 17.40 5 24 7 14.10 5 27 6 15.00 4
non 32 32 10 25.30 5 31 13 17.59 7 33 13 17.16 6 34 14 17.55 6
insurers 28 24 9 21.25 5 25 10 19.80 5 34 11 14.75 4 30 10 14.42 4
non 30 36 5 22.50 3 31 6 21.67 3 26 n/a 11.50 1 29 n/a 18.00 1
4-year APH
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
avg 
yield
std 
dev
avg 
price # obs
insurers 74 66 20 5.88 7 64 27 4.38 8 84 24 4.31 6 81 23 4.38 6
non 54 48 11 4.59 4 47 2 4.00 3 51 11 4.00 3 71 21 2.75 3
insurers 60 62 21 5.03 4 58 32 4.05 3 58 39 3.52 3 62 30 3.42 3
non 75 76 15 5.50 5 69 26 3.88 6 75 20 3.60 5 80 11 3.12 5
insurers 67 75 15 n/a 2 69 2 3.00 3 65 n/a n/a 1 60 n/a n/a 1
non 61 52 21 3.58 5 61 18 4.53 6 67 3 2.11 2 65 n/a n/a 1
IA
MN
WI
IA
MN
WI
2008
Oats
2006 20052007
2008 2007 2006 2005
IA
MN
WI
Soybeans
Corn
2008 2007 2006 2005
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Table 3 also shows that as a consequence of receiving higher prices for their crops, 
organic corn and oats producers obtained an average revenue per acre about 80% higher than that 
of their conventional counterparts; while for soybean it was about 60% more. The differential 
yield and price level for organic soybean that we found is very similar to the ones that McBride 
and Greene (2008) reported using a nationwide on-farm survey. Yet such price difference is not 
reflected in the crop insurance coverage that organic producers can obtain. 
Table 4 shows a comparison between the insured and non-insured organic producers that 
we surveyed regarding average yield, yield variability across farmers and average price. Yields 
were sometimes lower for non-insurers for corn and oats, but were higher in all cases (but one) 
for soybean. A relevant finding is that for all three crops and states, in most instances the 
standard deviation of yields across farmers was higher for insurers than for non-insurers, 
suggesting that insurers’ distribution is less uniform (has more variability) than that of non-
insurers. In terms of price differential between insurers and non insurers, there seems to be none. 
 
V. Yield Density Function Comparison between Organic and Conventional Corn and 
Soybean Producers in Iowa 
Given the significant difference in yield levels between organic and conventional corn and 
soybean producers described in the previous section, it seems useful to compare the extent to 
which their density functions differ. To perform such comparison, we estimated the 
nonparametric density function of their yields. Since we were able to obtain farm-level data for 
conventional producers for Iowa only (from the Iowa Farm Business Association (IFBA)), the 
density function comparison is for that state. Therefore, we used the survey panel data of corn 
and soybean yields for those organic producers that provided us with four successive years of 
their APHs,3 and we used the IFBA data similarly. One caveat of constructing the 4-year 
complete APH is that we had a limited number of observations available for organic farmers that 
reported at least a 4 years of their historic yields; they were 17 and 14 for corn and soybean, 
respectively. Consequently, the analysis described below is valid as a case study; once more data 
become available, future research could confirm our results. 
                                                        
3We did not use the RMA’s transition or T-Yield procedure, by which the missing data are replaced by a percentage 
of the county average yield according to the number of years missing. For a complete description of APH rules and 
T-Yields definitions, see http://www.rma.usda.gov/FTP/Publications/directives/18000/pdf/05_18010.pdf 
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To estimate the yield density functions, we used the kernel density estimator with kernel K 
defined as: 
1
1
ˆ( )
N
i
i
x Xf x K
Nh h
=
− 
=  
 
∑                                            (2) 
 
where N is the number of observations and h is the bandwidth or smoothing parameter. 
Regarding the choice of function K(·), Dinardo and Tobias (2001, p.9) explain that “…the 
particular kernel employed imposes nothing on the shape of the probability density function we 
estimate”, and then they continue arguing that the choice of bandwidth is more important; but 
they add that “despite a huge literature […] bandwidth choice remains largely an art”. As 
Silverman (1986) suggests, the choice of the bandwidth hinges on the purpose for which the 
density estimate will be used, and he further adds that in some cases a subjective choice could be 
sufficient and even desirable. Hence, in our estimates we chose the smallest h that would make 
the yield densities smooth. 
We estimated the yield density functions for organic and conventional corn and soybean 
using the 4-year APH farm-level data, and drawing 1,000 estimates from them to construct their 
respective pdfs. The estimated densities for corn and soybean are shown in panels A and B of 
figure 8, respectively. The underlying assumption behind the 5% surcharge to organic farmers is 
that, when comparing the distributions of organic and conventional crop yields, the only 
difference between them is that organic crops should exhibit 5% more risk than conventional 
ones. Such clear-cut result cannot be inferred from figure 8; nevertheless, both panels of that 
figure clearly show that the yield distributions for organic and conventional corn and soybean are 
different because the mean of the organic pdfs are to the left of the conventional ones, denoting 
their lower mean yields.  
Thus, the empirical evidence indicates that organic yields of both crops do not come from 
the same distribution as that of their conventional counterparts, as implied by the current crop 
insurance policy. Consequently, if our results extended to larger (organic) data analyses and 
other crops, this evidence should be used by RMA to provide crop insurance for organic 
producers based on their idiosyncratic yield curves, rather than extrapolating the ones used for 
conventional farmers. 
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Figure 8. Iowa organic and conventional producers' 4-year yield APH kernel  
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VI. Conclusions 
In recent years there has been a steady and significant growth of the organic sector (OTA, 2009). 
However, little economic research has been performed on the subject, likely due to the lack of 
data availability. Also likely because of it, the creation of the current crop insurance policy for 
organic farmers has been ad hoc and not based on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the organic 
sector. The present study aimed at starting filling this gap; in particular at analyzing the demand 
for crop insurance and differential production risk of organic farmers in three states where 
acreage for organic production is among the greatest in the U.S. for the crops that we studied. 
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In this manuscript we analyzed organic producers’ demand for crop insurance using a 
discrete choice model that showed the impact of demographic variables on their purchasing and 
product choice decisions. But perhaps more importantly, we complemented those results with 
additional crop insurance usage information, as well as yield, price and revenue comparisons 
between organic and conventional producers. Although some authors have reported that organic 
and conventional yields are equivalent, in this study we found that corn and soybean under 
organic management attain about 70% of the yield of that of conventional crops. The 
dissimilarity of the results could be due to the fact that many of those authors performed the 
experiments on (smaller) experimental plots that are more easily controlled for weeds than entire 
farms are. However, those experiments reveal the potential for organic farming of achieving 
yields equivalent to those of conventional crops, something exemplified by the yield level for 
organic oats achieved by producers in our sample. The present study provides further evidence 
that organic producers obtain higher prices than their conventional fellows. In fact, in our sample 
the higher prices received for the organic crops more than offset their lower yields, resulting in 
higher revenues per acre compared to their conventional counterparts. 
Our findings regarding the different yield levels (and their probability distribution 
functions) between organic and conventional corn and soybean producers, along with the 
substantial price premiums that organic farmers obtain, call for RMA to perform additional 
analyses to evaluate the validity of our findings on a nationwide basis and, if so, modify the 
current organic farming insurance policy accordingly to provide a more actuarially fair coverage 
to organic producers.  
 
23 
References 
Badgley C., J. Moghtader, E. Quintero, E. Zakem, M.J. Chappell, K. Avilés-Vázquez, A. Samulon 
and I. Perfecto. 2007. Organic agriculture and the global food supply. Renewable Agricultural 
Food System (22):86-108 
Barnett, B .J. 1993. Explaining Participation in the Federal Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance Program.  
PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky 
Barnett, B.J., J.R. Skees, and J.D. Hourigan. 1990 "Explaining Participation in Federal Crop 
Insurance. Dept. of Agricultural Economics Staff Paper 275, University of Kentucky 
Born, H. 2005. Marketing Organic Grains. National Sustainable Agricultural Information Service 
http://attra.ncat.org/attra-pub/PDF/marketingorganicgrains.pdf 
Carriquiry, M.A., B. Babcock and C. E. Hart. 2008. Using a Farmer’s Beta for Imporved Estimation 
of Expected Yields. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 33:52-68 
Calvin, L. 1992. Participation in the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program. Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, ERS Technical Bulletin 1800 
Chen, X., H.H. Wang, L.D. Makus. 2007. Production risk and crop insurance effectiveness: Organic 
versus conventional apples. SCC-76: Economics and Management Risk in Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, Gulf Shores, AL 
Coble, K. H., T. 0. Knight, R. D. Pope, and J. R Williams. 1996. Modeling Farm-Level Crop 
Insurance Demand with Panel Data. American Journal of Agicultural. Econonics 78:439-47 
Delate, K.M. 2002. Using an agroecological approach to farming systems research. HortTechnology 
12(3):345-354 
Delate, K., M. Duffy, C. Chase, A. Holste, H. Friederich and N Wantate. 2003. An economic 
comparison of organic and conventional grain crops in a long-term agroecological research 
(LTAR) site in Iowa. American Journal of Alternative Agriculture 18(1):1-11 
Delate, K., and Cambardella, C. 2004. Agroecosystem performance during transition to certified 
organic grain production. Agronomy Journal 96:1288-1298 
Dimitri C. and C. Greene. 2002. Recent Growth Patterns in the U.S. Organic Foods Market. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Market and Trade Economics Division 
and Resource Economics Division. Agriculture Information Bulletin Number 777 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib777/ 
Dimitri, C. and L. Oberholtzer. 2008a. The U.S. Organic Handling Sector in 2004: Baseline Findings 
of the Nationwide Survey of Organic Manufacturers, Processors, and Distributors. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Economic Information Bulletin Number 
36 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/EIB36/EIB36.pdf 
Dimitri, C. and L. Oberholtzer. 2008b. Using Vertically Coordinated Relationships To Overcome 
Tight Supply in the Organic Market. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/VGS/2008/10Oct/VGS32901/VGS32901.pdf 
DiNardo J. and J.L. Tobias. 2001. Nonparametric Density and Regression Estimation. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives.  15 (4) 11-28 
Gardner, B. L., and R. A. Kramer. 1986. Experience with Crop Insurance Programs in the United 
States. Crop Insurance forAgricultural Development: Issues and Experience, eds., P. Hazzell, C. 
Pomereda, and A. Valdez, pp. 195-222. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 
24 
Goodwin, B.J. 1993. An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Crop Insurance.  American Journal of 
Agicultural Econonics  75:425-34 
Greene, C. and Kremen, A. 2003. U.S. Organic Farming in 2000-2001: Adoption of Certified 
Systems. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Resource Economics 
Division, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 780. http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib780/ 
Hanson, J., R. Dismukes, W. Chambers, C. Greene, A. Kremen. 2004. Risk and risk management in 
organic agriculture: Views of organic farmers. Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 
19(4):218-227 
Just, R., and L. Calvin. 1994. An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Participation in Crop Insurance. 
Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence, eds., D. L. Hueth and W. H. 
Furtan, pp. 205-52. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994 
Just, R.E., L. Calvin and J. Quiggin. 1999. Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 81:835-849 
MacDonald, J., J. Perry, M. Ahearn, D. Banker, W. Chambers, C. Dimitri, N. Key, K. Nelson, and L. 
Southard. 2004. Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of 
Agricultural Commodities. U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS, Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 837 http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer837/aer837.pdf 
Mäder, P., A. Fließach, D. Dubois, L. Gunst, P. Fried, and U. Niggli. 2002. Soil fertility and 
biodiversity in organic farming. Science 296:1694-1697 
Makki, S.S. and A. Somwaru. 2001. Farmers’ Participation in Crop Insurance Markets: Creating the 
Right Incentives. American Journal of Agicultural. Econonics. 83:662-667 
McBride, W.D. and Greene, C. 2008. The profitability of organic soybean production. Presented 
at the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Annual Meeting, Orlando, FL, July 
27-29 2008 
Mishra, A., and B.K. Goodwin. 2003. Adoption of Crop versus Revenue Insurance: A Farm-Level 
Analysis.’ Agricultural Finance Review 63:143–55 
Organic Farming Research Foundation (OFRF). 2001. OFRF Newsletter, Vol. 10. OFRF, Santa Cruz, 
CA 
Organic Trade Association (OTA). 2009. Organic Industry Survey 
http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/01a_OTAExecutiveSummary.pdf 
Pimentel, D., Hepperly, P., Hanson, J., Douds, D., Seidel, R. 2005. Environmental, energetic and 
economic comparisons of organic and conventional farming systems. BioScience 55 (7): 573-582 
Porter, P. 2003. Organic and other management strategies with two- and four-year crop rotations in 
Minnesota. Agron. J. 95:233-244 
Richards, T.J. 2000. A two-Stage Model of the Demand for Specialty Crop Insurance. American 
Journal of Agicultural Econonics . 25:177-194  
Risk Management Agency (RMA), USDA. 2008 Organic Farming Practices, Insurance Fact Sheet. 
http://www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/2006/organics.pdf 
Shaik, S. K.H.Coble, T.O. Knight, A.E. Baquet, G.F. Patrick. 2008. Crop Revenue and Yield 
Insurance Demand: A Subjective Probability Approach. Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, 40, 3:757-766 
25 
Sherrick, B.J., Barry, P.J., Ellinger, P. N. and Schnitkey, G.D. 2004. Factors Influencing Farmer’s 
Crop Insurance Decisions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics  86(1): 103–114 
Silverman, B. (1986) Density Estimation for Statistician and Data Analysis, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 
1998 
Singerman, A. and S. Lence. (2010). How Closely Related Are the Prices of Organic and 
Conventional Corn and Soybean? Working paper, Department of Economics, Iowa State 
University. Selected Poster to be presented at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 
2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010 
Smith, V.H. and A.E. Baquet. 1996. The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance: Evidence from 
Montana Wheat Farms . American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(1):189-201 
USDA-ERS. 2008a. Table 3. Certified organic and total U.S. acreage, selected crops and 
livestock, 1995-2008. Data file: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/organic/Data/CertifiedandtotalUSacreageselectedcropslivestock.xls 
USDA-ERS. 2008b. Table 6. Certified organic grains. Data file: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/organic/Data/Grain.xls 
USDA-ERS. 2008c. Table 7. Certified organic beans. Data file: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/organic/Data/Beans.xls 
Vandeveer  M.L and E. T. Loehman. 1994. Farmer Response to Modified Crop Insurance: A Case 
Study of Corn in Indiana . American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 76: 128-140 
 
 
